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Introduction 
In this study we examine variations in regional political regimes which have developed under Russia’s 
electoral authoritarian system of governance. The Russian Federation is one of the most highly 
asymmetrical federations in the world and its 85 regions vary widely in the size of their territories and 
populations, their socio-economic status, and ethnic composition, and thus it is not surprising that their 
political regimes will also differ in their levels of democracy and authoritarianism.  
Our examination of regional regimes focuses on regional assembly elections which are the best 
indicators of regime type. In contrast to previous studies of regional elections in Russia which have 
focused on the party list votes or aggregate results, we analyse and compare elections results and levels 
of electoral contestation in both the party list (PL) and single member district (SMD) contests. The study 
builds on our earlier analysis of regional elections conducted over the period 2008-12 where we found 
important cross regional variations in support for the Kremlin’s “party of power”, United Russia (Panov 
and Ross 2013).  
In 2012, significant changes to electoral and party legislation were adopted in response to anti-
government protests, and further important legislative amendments were made in 2014. In this study we 
compare the results of regional assembly elections in the post-protest electoral cycle of 2013-17 with the 
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elections which were conducted in the pre-protest cycle of 2008-12, and we examine the impact of the 
new electoral and party laws on the levels of support for United Russia.  
A key question addressed in the study is, to what degree are there stable patterns of electoral 
contestation and support for United Russia across the two election cycles?  Building on the work of 
Howard and Roessler (2006), we show that there are four sub-national regime types in Russia, which we 
define as: “hegemonic authoritarian,” “semi-hegemonic authoritarian,” “clearly-competitive 
authoritarian” and “moderately-competitive authoritarian”. We find that the cross regional variations in 
the election contests are fairly stable across these two cycles, which suggests that ‘there is a territorial 
factor at work’ (Keating 2008, 67), and that local politics and political agency need to be taken into 
account, when analysing electoral politics in Russia.  
We begin with a brief review of the main theoretical points important for the study of 
differentiation of political regimes in multi-level polities and apply them to Russia. This is followed by 
a detailed account of the changes made to Russia’s electoral and party legislation, and their impact on 
the party systems at the regional level. Next, we present our empirical data and analyse the level of 
competitiveness of regional elections across the two election cycles in general, as well as in cross-
regional perspective. The conclusion summarizes the study’s main findings. 
 
National and regional politics under electoral authoritarianism 
As has been demonstrated by scholars of territorial politics, different levels of a polity may encompass 
different degrees of contestation, authoritarianism and democracy (Gibson 2005, 2010; Gilley 2010; 
Giraudi 2015). National level political practices may be more pluralistic than local level politics and vice 
versa, and there may be “democratic enclaves” in authoritarian regimes and “authoritarian enclaves” in 
democratic regimes.  
We should also stress, that in federal systems, more autonomy at the local level does not 
necessarily lead to more democracy. As Behrend and Whitehead stress, ‘federalism, can be exploited by 
undemocratic subnational politicians who are able to claim “boundary control” under federalism’s rules 
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in order to keep the central government out of “their” strongholds and thwart the development of 
democracy’ (2016, 155). This has certainly been the case in Russia, where regional elites have more 
often used their federal powers of sovereignty and political autonomy, to instigate various types of 
authoritarian regimes, rather than to promote the development of democracy. Moreover, in Russia, it has 
been those federal subjects which were granted the greatest levels of constitutional autonomy, namely 
the 21 ethnic republics, which have been able to forge the most authoritarian sub-national regimes (Ross 
2002; Panov and Ross 2013).  
The variations in regime-types between national and sub-national levels, as well as across sub-
national units are facilitated by the development of different forms of electoral authoritarianism in 
Russia’s regions. These semi-authoritarian regimes, ‘allow multiple parties to compete in elections, but 
they do so under patently unfair conditions. Incumbents may place barriers on opposition parties’ ability 
to campaign; generate a progovernment media bias; stack electoral commissions and courts with their 
supporters; or resort to stuffing boxes and manipulating vote tabulations’ (Donno 2013, 704). According 
to Schedler, rulers of “electoral authoritarian” regimes, strive ‘to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy 
without running the risk of democratic uncertainty’ (2002, 3). 
“Electoral authoritarian” regimes may be divided into two different types, “hegemonic” and 
“competitive” (see Donno 2013). In “competitive authoritarian” regimes, ‘electoral uncertainty exists. 
The electoral process is manipulated but is not fully controlled by the ruling party whilst opposition 
parties retain the capacity to occasionally spring surprise victories despite competing on an uneven 
playing field’ (White 2017). “Hegemonic authoritarian” regimes also hold regular elections, ‘but in 
addition to widespread violations of political, civil and human rights, the elections are not actually 
competitive’ (Howard and Roessler 2006). Moreover, ‘because no other party, except the ruling one, is 
allowed to effectively compete … the dominant candidate or party wins overwhelmingly, leading to a 
de facto one-party state’ (ibid).  In Russia, electoral authoritarian regimes have been instigated at both 
the centre and in the regions but there are important variations in the levels of support for United Russia, 
3
and in the degrees of contestation in regional assemblies (see Golosov 2012; Panov and Ross 2013; 
2016, 2018; Reisinger and Moraski 2010; White 2016).  
Since the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as Russian President in 2000, the regime has waged an 
attack on the principles and practices of federalism, and there has been a recentralisation by the Kremlin 
of many of the constitutional powers of the federal subjects, particularly those powers which are shared 
between the centre and the federal subjects (see Ross 2002, 2011). The Kremlin has attempted to impose 
a “power vertical”.1 As a result, relations between the federal government and the regions are not based 
on the classic federal principles of ‘self-rule and shared rule’. Instead, hierarchy’, ‘centralisation’, and 
‘unity’ are the guiding principles of inter-governmental relations. Thus, the Russian Federation may best 
be defined as a quasi-unitary state.  
However, Putin’s centralising policies and “power vertical” sought to bring the regions under 
central control rather than making them identical. Important variations in the degrees of democracy and 
authoritarianism are still present at the regional level, and regional elites, particularly in the ethnic 
republics have been able to carve out significant areas of political autonomy, as long as they keep ethnic 
tensions at bay and deliver votes to the Kremlin (Panov and Ross 2013, 2016; Saikkonen 2016). As 
Libman notes, ‘some regions of Russia are characterized by higher levels of political pluralism… and 
the governor has to recruit the support of multiple elite factions to effectively govern the province’ (2017, 
129), whilst in other regions, there is a ‘complete unity of the regional elite under the control of the 
governor. There is no open or even hidden political competition’, and ‘the governor’s political machine 
… is able to deliver the necessary electoral outcomes without much resistance’ (ibid).  
As we demonstrate below, the combination of multi-level politics in Russia’s highly 
asymmetrical federation, with the development of different types of “electoral authoritarianism”, has 
created a rich and diverse tapestry of sub-national political regimes. Regional elites have used their 
                                                          
1 The “power vertical” is a concept used by Russian scholars which refers to the attempts by the Putin regime to 
create a hierarchical and centralised system of executive authority and direct control over the work of the 
regional governors and policy making in the regions.   
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federal powers to carve out important areas of political autonomy. Even under Putin’s highly centralised 
system of rule and his ‘power vertical’, as this study will demonstrate, there are still important regional 
differences in the levels of political pluralism, contestation and electoral politics. 
 
Changes in Electoral and Party Legislation 
Before we turn to our empirical analysis of the elections it is important to present a summary of 
the key changes to electoral and party legislation. Since Putin came to power in 2000, there have been 
scores of amendments to election and party legislation in the regions. As Hutcheson notes, over the 
period 2003-16, the 2001 Law on Political Parties was amended 36 times, and the Federal Law of June 
2002, No. 67, on ‘Fundamental Guarantees of Electoral Rights’ (hereafter, Federal Law 2002), was 
amended 78 times (2017, 389-90). New electoral and party laws have been adopted at almost every new 
round of regional elections to ensure Urn ’s dominance.  
Up until 2012 Federal legislation stipulated that elections for regional assemblies could take place 
in either March or October. In 2012 amendments were made to Federal Law 2002 which stipulated that 
regional elections were henceforth to be held once in a year. In 2012 they took place in October, and 
since 2013 they have been held each September. However, there is no single date when all the regional 
legislatures are re-elected, each legislature has its own term of office.  
Federal Law 2002 also stipulated that from 14 July 2003 at least half of the seats in regional 
assemblies would be contested in a Party List Proportional Representation system (PLPR). Whilst the 
overwhelming majority introduced a mixed electoral system (with 50% PLPR elections and 50% SMD 
elections), 10 regions adopted full PLPR systems.2 Amendments to electoral legislation in 2013 (see 
Federal Law No. 303, 2 November 2013), lowered the mandatory minimum percentage of proportional 
                                                          
2 In those assemblies where there are an odd number of seats, the number of deputies elected by PLPR 
is 50%+1. The only exception here is Volgograd Oblast’ where 22 deputies are elected by PLPR and 
16 by pluralist rule. 
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representation seats in regional assemblies from 50% to 25%, and the requirement to use proportional 
representation was lifted completely for Moscow and St. Petersburg. However, only Moscow adopted 
the new rules and moved to a full plural system with 100% of the deputies elected in single member 
districts (SMDs). All other regions still use either a mixed or PLPR system.  
Generally, a reformation of party-electoral rules is the norm in electoral authoritarian regimes, 
which usually change the rules to ensure the monopoly of the ruling elite. However, the 2012 round of 
reforms was of special significance, as it was initiated by a regime in crisis, which many senior 
politicians feared was in danger of toppling.  It has been estimated that between 70 and 120 thousand 
protestors took part in the largest demonstrations (Shevtsova 2012: 20) against the regime, which took 
place in Moscow on the 10th and 24th of December 2011, the 4th of February, and the 5th and 10th of 
March 2012. At a time when the regime appeared weak and was under immense pressure, the leadership 
felt the need to send a strong signal to the electorate to reassure them that it understood their grievances. 
Thus, out of desperation the Kremlin pushed through radical changes to electoral and party registration 
laws in Spring 2012, which made it much easier for parties to register and participate in elections. 
According to these amendments the number of party members required to be legally registered was 
drastically reduced from 40,000 to just 500 (Federal Law 28, 2 April, 2012). As a result, the number of 
parties have risen sharply from 7 in 2011 to 78 in 2017.  
Furthermore, some amendments were introduced to electoral legislation. In order to register 
candidates were required to gather nomination signatures (usually 2% of the regional electorate). 
However, the changes made in 2012 now stipulated that party list candidates no longer needed to submit 
nomination signatures, and the maximum number of signatures required by independent candidates was 
lowered from 2% to 0.5% (see, Federal Law No. 41, 2 May 2012). These developments made it easier 
for opposition parties to pass the registration hurdles. The average number of registered party lists per 
region rose from 13.2 in 2012 to 17.2 in September 2013 (Kynev and Lyubarev 2016, 18).  
However, after the wave of protests ebbed, and the regime felt more secure, further changes took 
place in May 2014 which reinstated the requirement of party list candidates to collect nomination 
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signatures (although the percentage of signatures required was lowered from 2% to 0.5% of the 
electorate). At the same time, the number of signatures demanded for candidates in the single mandate 
elections was raised from 0.5 to 3% of the electorate (Federal Law, No. 95, 5 May 2014). In addition, 
the maximum electoral threshold was lowered from 7 to 5% (Korgunyuk, Ross and Shpagin 2018, 156). 
However, parties which hold seats in the Duma or receive 3% of the votes in elections to the State Duma 
are exempt from gathering signatures (Ibid). This meant that the four Duma parliamentary parties United 
Russia (UR), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia (JR) qualified for the subsequent elections by default.  
In addition, parties which hold seats in, or win 3% of the votes in regional assemblies, or 0.5% 
of the total number of seats in a region’s municipal councils, are exempt from submitting signatures in 
those particular regions, and this has allowed a number of opposition parties, to compete in a few regions 
without submitting signatures (Korgunyuk, Ross and Shpagin 2018, 156). The reinstatement of the need 
to gather nomination signatures in 2014 resulted in a sharp fall in the average number of party lists which 
were registered for regional assembly elections, from 17.2 in 2013 to 7.8 in 2015, 6.9 in 2016 and 7.7 in 
2017 (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maksimov 2017, 5).  
These new electoral and party laws have created a specific type of party system in Russian 
regions. First of all, it is important to stress that the party system is built around UR which wins a 
majority of seats in all regional legislatures. Second, there have been three “second order” parties, the 
so-called “parliamentary opposition” that regularly participate in almost all of the regional assembly 
elections (and usually win some seats) - CPRF, LDPR and JR. Third, there are some small opposition 
parties such as the Patriots of Russia, Yabloko and so forth, that sometimes win seats in regional 
assemblies. In the framework of the very strict rules governing party registration, the number of small 
parties had steadily fallen over the second half of the 2000s. Whilst there were 13 parties registered at 
the end of 2007, their number fell to 7 in 2011. As noted above, the 2012 legislation relaxed the rules 
governing the registration of parties and this led to a sharp increase in their numbers from 33 in 2012 to 
78 in 2017. In 2015, 48 parties took part in the regional elections, in 2016 there were 55 parties and 28 
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in 2017. However, as is demonstrated in the data below, none of these newly created parties won more 
than a handful of seats in the regional elections. Thus, despite the large increase in the number of parties 
registered, the regional assemblies continue to be dominated by United Russia and the three “second 
order” parties. 
Falling Rates of Turnout 
However, whilst United Russia continues to dominate the regional assemblies, one factor which 
is potentially worrying for the regime is the decline in the levels of turnout which, if this trend continues, 
may gradually lead to an erosion of the legitimacy of the party. Whilst United Russia has been successful 
in mobilising the electorate in the “hegemonic authoritarian” regions, where over 70% of the electorate 
regularly turnout to vote, in other regions citizen participation is much lower. Thus, for example, as 
Lyubarev (2017, 6) notes, in a majority of the elections which took place over the period 2012-15 (not 
counting those which took place at the same time as the Presidential elections in March 2012), turnout 
was lower than in the previous elections: in 8 regions the level of citizen participation dropped by more 
than 10% (see Panov and Ross, 2016). In the most recent round of elections which took place in 2017 
the average turnout dropped from 42.3% in 2012 to 34.7% We should also stress that in those regions 
where turnout is much higher than the average (for example, 92% in Chechnya in 2013) this is often an 
indicator that they have been fraudulent. In many cases there is a correlation between high turnout and 
higher than average votes for United Russia which suggests that additional ballot papers have been 
artificially manufactured in support of the Kremlin’s party (see Panov and Ross, 2016). 
Two Cycles of Regional Assembly Elections  
We examine two cycles of regional assembly elections in 83 of Russia’s 85 regions.3 In the first cycle 
(2008-12), only 10 regions adopted full PLPR systems, which included the 5 Caucasian republics of 
                                                          
3 We exclude Crimea and Sevastopol’ as they became de-facto parts of the Russian Federation only in 
2014 and were therefore absent in the first cycle. In the first cycle 2008-2012, due to the fact, that 
some regional legislatures had four-year terms of office, in some regions elections were held twice; 
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Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kabardino-Balkariya, Kalmykiya and Chechnya, in addition to, the Nenets AO; 
Amur, Kaluga, and Tula oblasts, and the city of St. Petersburg. However, only the Caucasian republics 
maintained a full PLPR system in the second cycle (2013-17), whereas 5 other regions moved from a 
full PLPR to a mixed system. Additionally, two other republics (Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and North 
Ossetiya) transferred from a mixed to a full PLPR system. In sum, taking into account the fact that 
Moscow adopted a plural SMD system in the second cycle, we have 70 regions which used a mix 
electoral system in both cycles, 5 which adopted a full PLPR system in both cycles, and 8 regions which 
moved from one system to another. 
Although the PLPR and SMD types of elections will influence each other, due to the so called 
‘contamination effects’ (Moser and Scheiner 2004; Herron and Nishikawa 2001), what we have in 
essence are two different electoral races. Thus, we would expect to see differences in the levels of 
contestation and in the results of the PLPR and SMD elections.  
The Competitiveness of Party List Elections 
To measure the degree of competitiveness in the PLPR part of the electoral system, we employ 
the “effective number of parties (ENP)” indicator. Initially this was proposed by Laakso and Taagepera 
(1979). However, as many scholars have argued, Laakso and Taagepera’s ENP has some disadvantages, 
particularly for the measurement of party systems with a dominant party (such as Russia), since their 
method overemphasizes the weight of minor parties (Golosov 2010; Molinar 2001). In order to eliminate 
this disadvantage, Golosov proposed a different formula for calculating the ENP. The values of the 
                                                          
and we take the latest elections. In Buryatiya and Smolensk oblast’ there were no elections over the 
period of 2008-2012, as the terms of office of these regional assemblies were extended to 2013, 
therefore for these regions we include the elections which took place in December 2007. 
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effective number of parties in all regional legislatures, which we calculated using Golosov’s 
methodology (ENPgol), are presented in Table 1.4 
[Table 1 about here] 
As can be seen in Table 2, in the first cycle, the average value of the ENPgol was 2.193. This 
score accords with a very common scenario, whereby United Russia as the dominant party wins 
approximately half of the votes and commands a stable majority in each regional assembly. The other 
half of the votes were picked up by the “second order” parties - CPRF, LDPR and JR. In addition, 4 
minor parties (Agrarian, Yabloko, Patriots, and Right Cause) won seats in just 13 regions: in total, they 
gained only 48 seats in the PLPR part of the elections.  
[Table 2 about here] 
For the second electoral cycle, the general picture did not substantially change. UR continued to 
dominate all the regional elections. Indeed, the number of seats won by UR even increased from 1346 
to 1403. As previously, the parties of the “second order” gained some seats in most regional assemblies. 
In spite of the fact that that the number of minor parties increased hugely in the second cycle, their results 
were almost the same as in the first cycle - 44 seats. As a result, the average value of the ENPgol even 
decreased to 2.027 in the second cycle of elections.  
The Competitiveness of Single Member District Elections 
Since some regions use a full PLPR system, they are excluded from the analysis. Also, we 
exclude all of the multi-members districts (MMDs) which were used in some cases in 6 regions including 
Chukotka, where only MMDs are used instead of SMDs. As a result, we have 72 regions with SMDs in 
                                                          
4 In calculating the ENPgol, we take into account the results (shares of votes) of United Russia, the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Just Russia. 
The results of minor parties are taken into account only in those cases where they overcome the 
electoral threshold. 
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the first cycle and 75 – in the second. The total number of SMDs in each cycle is thus, 1740 and 1766 
respectively. 
The very large number of SMDs makes it problematic to use the same indicator (ENPgol) which 
we employed to measure the PLPR campaigns. Besides, it seems to be unnecessary, as the pattern of 
contestation in the majoritarian SMDs are so different from those in PLPR elections that to conduct such 
a comparison would clearly not yield very meaningful results. Thus, we need to find another type of 
measurement. A great deal of scholarly literature has been devoted to the measurement of the degree of 
competitiveness in SMDs. Generally, it is possible to distinguish two main approaches (Burshard 2013, 
115-116). The first employs a “margin of victory indicator.” If the margin is equal to or more than a 
specific figure (which has been calculated as between 10 to 20 per cent by different scholars), the 
elections are considered as non-competitive. The second is based on the vote share of the winner. If the 
candidate wins above a certain per cent of the votes (defined as 55 or 60 per cent), the elections are 
considered as non-competitive.  
Both of these methods correlate very well with one other and have their own advantages. For that 
reason, we combine the key elements of each and develop a modified version of measurement. We 
surmise that the levels of competition in the SMDs will differ in important respects as regard levels of 
fragmentation. In the case of fragmented competition, when votes are shared between many candidates, 
more than 50% of votes for the winner would appear to be high enough to recognize the elections as 
non-competitive. An electoral campaign is considered to be fragmented if more than two candidates 
receive more than 10% of the votes, which would mean that the margin of victory was at least 20%. In 
the case of a polarized campaign, 50% and over is not high enough, as the runner up may gain a share 
close to 50%. Therefore, for polarized elections the threshold of competitiveness should be 60% (here 
the margin of victory indicator would be 20% or more).   
In accordance with these criteria, each of the SMDs was examined and defined as either 
competitive or non-competitive. Next, we counted the share of non-competitive SMDs in each regional 
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assembly election. The values of this index are presented in Table 15 and the general results in Table 3. 
They confirm the well-known finding that UR always fares much better in the SMDs than the PLPR 
system. In the first cycle, UR candidates won 84.7% of the SMDs, while in the PLPR part – they gained 
60.5% of the seats; in the second cycle – they fared even better in the SMDs winning 90% in comparison 
to the 66.7% of the mandates in the PLPR races.  
The main reasons for URs greater success in the SMDs are as follows: elections in SMDs are 
based much more on the personal attributes of the candidates, and UR has much more authoritative and 
popular politicians than any of the other parties. UR would clearly benefit if the party list were abolished 
outright as it fares so much better in the SMD races. However, UR has other reasons for maintaining the 
PLPR system: politicians elected in the SMDs tend to be less loyal to the party than those elected in the 
party lists, and UR needs to use the PLPR elections to promote some candidates with poor electoral 
ratings (who would fail to be elected in the SMDs). As has been demonstrated, UR also engages in the 
practice of co-opting candidates from other opposition parties (see Reuter and Turovsky 2014; Turovsky 
2015).  
[Table 3 about here] 
As regards the level of competitiveness of the SMD races, we find that approximately half of the 
SMDs are non-competitive (0.46 and 0.44 in the first and the second cycles respectively). It is noticeable 
that the shares of non-competitive SMDs, in which UR candidates won, were slightly higher than the 
general share of non-competitive SMDs in both cycles, whereas the shares of non-competitive SMDs, 
in which UR candidates lost, were much less – 0.09 and 0.11 respectively. Consequently, non-
competitive elections in the races, where UR candidates were defeated, are fairly unusual cases. At the 
same time, we have a large number of SMDs where UR did not nominate its own candidates – 60 in the 
first cycle and 78 in the second. This phenomenon is mostly explained by the fact that in the process of 
                                                          
5 For North Ossetiya, which was the only region to employ a two-round majority system in the SMDs 
(in the first cycle), we rely on the results of the first round. 
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inter-elite bargaining, UR reserved some SMDs for other parties or, more frequently, for those non-party 
candidates, which are influential and resourceful but for some reasons remain outside the party. That is 
why one can see that the shares of non-competitive SMDs without UR candidates are closer to the shares 
of non-competitive SMDs, where UR candidates won – 0.43 and 0.36. It is no accident that after 
elections many non-party candidates enter UR or at least UR’s parliamentary faction (for a detailed 
analysis of the subsequent trajectory of non-party candidates in the first cycle, see (Panov and Ross, 
2013).  
Hence, similar to the PLPR part of the electoral system, the general level of competitiveness has 
not significantly changed in the second electoral cycle in comparison to the first. The share of non-
competitive SMDs remains almost the same, no matter which aspect we consider: all SMDs, or districts 
won or lost by UR candidates, or districts without UR candidates. Consequently, the party and electoral 
reforms did not have a significant influence on the level of competitiveness of regional elections. Many 
of the new parties which emerged in the period 2012-17 were bogus or spoiler parties which were 
deliberately created to split the votes of the opposition, whilst many of the others, which were “created 
from above”, had low levels of party institutionalisation, very poor territorial structures and finance, and 
little grassroots support.  
Nevertheless, it has to be noted, that although the party reforms did not have much impact on the 
election results, they did influence the electoral strategies of the politicians. Since the range of parties 
expanded significantly, and nomination from parties was made easier, many candidates preferred to 
stand on a party platform rather than be nominated as non-party independents. As a result, the number 
of non-party winners in SMDs decreased from 126 to 83; moreover, while in the first cycle, the number 
of non-party candidates was close to 20%, in the second cycle, it fell to 7.5%.6  
 
                                                          
6 Calculated from information provided on the Russian Central Electoral Commission Website 
(http://www.cikf.ru). 
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Cross-Regional Variations in Competitiveness of Elections: Are There Stable Patterns? 
When we proceed to individual regional data, we find substantial cross-regional variations in the level 
of competitiveness in both cycles. Thus, the values of ENPgol ranged from 1.09 to 3.84 in the first, and 
from 1.11 to 3.47 in the second cycle. The share of non-competitive SMDs ranged from “0” to “1” in 
both electoral cycles. In order to examine cross-regional variations in detail, we placed the values of the 
two indexes (ENPgol and Share of Non-Competitive SMDs) on the planes (scatter diagrams) presented 
in Figure 1 (1st cycle) and Figure 2 (2nd cycle). The numbering of the regions is the same as in Table 1.7 
The vertical lines divide the planes into three sections according to the values of ENPgol which were 
2.00 and 3.00. In the 2nd cycle we moved the second line from the value of 3 to 2.7 for reasons that are 
explained below. These are conditional values which help us to separate: a) clearly non-competitive 
regions located to the left of the line that passes through the value 2.00; b) clearly competitive regions 
located to the right of the line that passes through the value 3.00. For the same purpose we drew some 
horizontal lines which pass through the values of the share of non-competitive SMDs as 0.7, 0.5, and 
0.3. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
As a result, it is possible to distinguish four contrasting groups of regions, based on the 
competitiveness of their assembly elections. We find that more than half of the regions occur in the same 
group (or very close to the group) in both cycles (see Table 4). These results suggest that what we are 
witnessing in these regions is a fairly stable pattern of electoral contestation. Consequently, these regions 
can be interpreted not only quantitatively, but qualitatively as corresponding to the criteria of one of the 
four sub-national regime types in Russia, which we define as: “hegemonic authoritarian,” “clearly-
                                                          
7 It has to be noted, that we had to omit those regions which used only PLPR system, Moscow where 
there were only SMDs in the second cycle, and Chukotka that used MMDs.  
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competitive authoritarian”, “semi-hegemonic authoritarian,” and “moderately-competitive 
authoritarian”. 
 [Table 4 about here]  
Hegemonic-authoritarian regions. The first group is located in the upper left corner of the planes 
– in the area where there is an almost complete lack of competition in both the PLPR and SMDs. In these 
regimes, a dominant actor, usually a governor is able to dominate the electoral field by controlling the 
nomination of candidates, and the organization of the electoral campaigns. As a result, in PLPR voting, 
UR wins an extraordinary high share of votes, comprising 70% and more. In SMDs, only candidates 
who have the backing of the authorities have any chance of winning elections. It should also be stressed 
that the position of all these regions on the planes are above the approximation line. In other words, the 
degree of competitiveness in the SMDs is even lower than in the PLPR races (if it is possible to talk 
about competitiveness at all in this group).  
Clearly competitive-authoritarian regions. The second group is located in the lower right corner 
of the planes – in the area of fairly high electoral competition in both the PLPR and SMDs. In the PLPR 
system, UR gains approximately 30-40% of votes. Although this percentage of the votes allows UR to 
gain an overall majority in the regional assemblies (due to the impact of the electoral threshold and the 
method of translating the percentage of votes into seats, and also the fact that UR candidates win the 
elections in most of the SMDs), but here they compete in a genuine struggle for power, and their victories 
are not predetermined as was the case with the regions in the first group. In the first cycle the group of 
10 regions is clearly separated in figure 1 by the intersection of the vertical line that passes through the 
value of ENPgol “3.0” and the horizontal line that passes through the value of the share of non-
competitive SMDs “0.3”. However, it should be stressed that almost all the elections in this group (Kirov 
is the only exception) were held in December 2011, when the surge of anti-UR voting was at its peak. 
During the second cycle, anti-UR sentiments were not so high. That is why we found it necessary to 
move the vertical line from the value of 3 to 2.7 in the second cycle in order to ensure a more comparative 
distribution of the values of the indices.  
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Whereas the regions of the first and second groups demonstrate a fairly high-level of correlation 
between their levels of competitiveness in the PLPR system and SMDs8, there are some regions where 
there is no correlation. In this regard, it is possible to distinguish two special groups of regions, which 
are presented in the figures as the third and the fourth groups.  
Semi-hegemonic authoritarian regions. The regions of the third group demonstrate a relatively 
high level of competitiveness in the PLPR contests, i.e., the values of ENPgol are between 2.0 and 3.0 
(2.7 for the second cycle), and low competitiveness in the SMDs (more than half of the SMDs are non-
competitive). There are not many regions in this group: 7 in the first and only 4 in the second cycle. 
Nevertheless, two regions - Kursk (37) and Stavropol (65) – appeared in the group in both cycles. This 
pattern can be interpreted as follows. In some respects, the third group is similar to the first one, but in 
contrast to the “hegemonic authoritarian pattern”, the regional ruling elite is not able to attain total 
control over the political realm. In these regions UR usually gains 40-50% of the votes, which guarantees 
them a majority of the seats in the regional assemblies, but it is not the same level of  “hegemony” which 
they achieve in the first group. At the same time, the regional ruling elite is able to coordinate its actions, 
sometimes bargain successfully, and it is able to distribute the SMDs between a number of groups so as 
to avoid having to engage in an open struggle for seats. In some SMDs UR deliberately did not nominate 
its candidates, allowing members of other parties to wins seats, which are subsequently co-opted into 
the regional elite.  
Moderately-competitive authoritarian regions. The fourth group includes those regions which 
display the same level of competitiveness in the PLPR races as the third group, but which exhibit fairly 
high competitive races in the SMDs (less than one third of the SMDs are non-competitive). As in the 
previous group, UR gains approximately 40-50% of votes. In other words, these regions do not 
demonstrate strong pro-opposition sentiments as was the case concerning the “clearly-competitive 
                                                          
8 This is the reason of high values correlation coefficients between ENPgol and Share of Non-
Competitive SMDs (they are statistically significant and take the values of “-0.803” and “-0.788”). 
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authoritarian” regions. Nevertheless, the fourth group of regions is likely to be closer to the second, 
rather than the third group, which is due to the fact that, whilst the regional elites here are able to 
consolidate and achieve fairly high results for UR in the PLPR part of elections, they have not been able 
to overcome intra-elite conflicts in the SMDs. As a consequence, more than two thirds of the districts 
here experienced competitive elections.  
The remaining regions are located between these four groups on the planes, or they fluctuate 
from one group to another. At the same time, it has to be stressed, that such “migrations” of regions, i.e., 
changes in their level of competitiveness (in both parts of the electoral system) are not substantial in 
most of the cases. As a rule, a region, which was in a particular group in one cycle, tends to remain in 
that group or does not move far, across the cycle.  
We find only six cases when a region changed groups. Furthermore, it has to be taken into 
account that not all changes will have the same importance. Thus, moving from the 1st to the 3rd group 
and vice versa, as well as from the 4th to the 2nd group and vice versa, are not so important as moving 
between the 1st and the 2nd or the 2nd and 3rd groups, due to the relative similarity between the 1st and 3rd 
groups, and between the 2nd and 4th groups.  
Therefore, we would not interpret the cases of Ryazan and Magadan, which moved from the 3rd 
to the 1st group), and Moscow Oblast (moved from the 4th to the 2nd) as something extraordinary. Irkutsk, 
which moved from the 3rd to the 4th group due to an increase in the level of competitiveness in the SMDs 
in the 2013 elections, is a more interesting case. However, the most fascinating cases are Moscow, which 
moved from the 1st to the 2nd group, and Leningrad Oblast which moved in the opposite direction, from 
the 2nd to the 3rd group. 
Factors which Influence Cross-Regional Variations 
The success of authoritarian elections, which are designed to guarantee the power of the ruling elite, is 
determined by the ability of regional elites to mobilize the electorate in support of the “party of power” 
(UR) and its candidates. The more effective the electoral mobilization, the less competitive will be the 
elections. The effectiveness of electoral mobilization depends on two main groups of factors – 
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“structural” and “agency”. “Structural factors” concern the presence of favourable social conditions, 
which enable the regional ruling elite to gain control over voting behaviour. As it has been demonstrated 
in the literature (see, for example: Magaloni 2006), the most favourable environments for electoral 
mobilization are those constituencies which are dominated by poorer voters, who are more sensitive to 
electoral mobilization, as well as rural settlements where citizens are bound together in tight social 
networks. The other powerful type of tight social network is based on ethnic ties; and it has been argued 
that non-Russian ethnic groups are more inclined to maintain stronger traditional (“primordial”) ties to 
their ethnic communities than is the case for ethnic Russians (Moraski and Reisinger, 2003; White 2015). 
A favourable setting for political mobilization is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, for electoral 
mobilization. The second factor (“agency”) governing the success of electoral mobilization is 
mobilization capability. Ruling elites should be able to create effective political machines, i.e., political 
organizations that mobilize electoral support (Stokes 2000; Golosov 2013). 
In their combination, structural and agency factors are expected to explain why the regions 
demonstrate different patterns of political competitiveness. Nevertheless, the question arises which 
group of factors is more important. In order to test the significance of structural factors we conducted a 
regression analysis (OLS regression), including in the equation some basic “structural” features of the 
regions as independent variables: 
1) Russians: Share of ethnic Russians in the population of a region (Vserossiiskaya Perepis’ 
Naseleniya 2010) is expected to increase competitiveness; 
2) Urban: Share of urban dwellers in the population of a region (Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-
ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2016, Table 2.3), is expected to increase competitiveness  
3) Poverty: Share of the population with incomes below the subsistence minimum (Regiony 
Rossii: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2016, Table 4.16), is expected to increase 
competitiveness.  
We develop a number of models with different dependent variables: (1) ENP as an average of 
the values of ENPgol in both cycles; (2) CompSMD as an average of the values of the shares of 
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competitive SMDs in a region. In order to combine the two parts of the elections, we also calculate (3) 
ENP*ComSMD as a result of multiplying the value of ENP by the value of CompSMD. These variables 
should be considered as approximations, as the positions of the regions are defined by their location on 
the planes, which cannot be measured directly, at least on the interval level. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The results of the regressions are presented in table 5 which demonstrates that the only variable 
that has stable and statistically significant coefficients, is the share of ethnic Russians. Thus, we can 
conclude that the ethnic composition of the regions is an important structural factor which helps to 
explain sub-national variations in Russia, whilst the other structural features of the regions are not 
significant. Although the values of the coefficients of the share of the Urban population have a positive 
sign, they are statistically insignificant in all the equations. This means that rural settlements, as such, 
are not favourable environments for electoral mobilization to the degree that was expected. This is 
explained by the fact that, as Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi have demonstrated, the key site of political 
mobilization in Russia is the workplace; and employers are especially well placed to translate their 
economic power over workers into political mobilization (2016). Therefore, it is not so important 
whether the workplace is located in rural or urban districts. Finally, in contrast to our expectations, the 
level of poverty has a positive sign, although the coefficients are statistically insignificant in two of the 
cases out of three. This conclusion is also backed up by the findings of Frye, Reuter Szakonyi (Ibid). 
Since electoral mobilization is carried out in the workplace, it is based much more on administrative 
pressure, than on vote-buying, so that wealthier employees are more sensitive to mobilization.  
Nevertheless, the values of R-square and, consequently the explanatory power of all these 
regression models are not very high. As our in-depth analysis demonstrates, many of the regions are 
outliers which deviate for the regression line to a great extent. Among the highest (most deviant) outliers 
is, for instance, Altay Republic, which we would expect to be among the “hegemonic authoritarian” 
regions, but which in fact, demonstrates a moderate level of competitiveness. On the other hand, such 
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Russian, urban and industrial regions as Kemerovo, Rostov, Saratov, Krasnodar etc. are unexpectedly 
much closer to the model of “hegemonic authoritarianism”.  
When we excluded the highest outliers (8 cases) and created three other regression models (4-5-
6), the general significance of the models, as well as the separate coefficients for each of the variables, 
markedly improved. Consequently, we can conclude that structural factors matter but we should not 
overemphasize their importance. In many cases, the potential for electoral mobilization is not fully 
realized, even when the structural conditions are positive, due to the relatively weak political machines 
of the regional leaders. And on the contrary, strong authoritarian leaders are able to gain control over 
regional politics, even when the structural features are weak. Also, it is noticeable that the values of R-
square in the models with CompSMD (2 and 5) are much lower than with ENP (1 and 4), which 
demonstrates that agency factors are especially important for the SMD races. In these elections, reducing 
the levels of competitiveness will depend much more on the ability of regional leaders to ensure elite 
cohesion over the bargaining and allocation of seats, than is the case in the party list races. 
The significance of agency factors is clearly demonstrated by the fact, that there are some cases 
when one region moved from one group to another between the two electoral cycles. Moscow is the 
most exemplary case which demonstrates that regional politics can be transformed substantially over a 
short period. In the first cycle, Moscow was in the first group because, as it is well known, under 
Luzhkov’s mayorship, a strong political machine was forged which guaranteed the hegemonic 
domination of one political actor, who was able to deliver the votes for the Kremlin, despite the 
traditionally high levels of opposition sentiments to be found in the capital. After the resignation of 
Luzhkov, his political machine was broken-up, and Moscow elections began to reflect more accurately 
the opinions of the city’s electorate. However, clearly the Kremlin cannot lose political control of the 
capital, therefore its candidates won both the mayoral and the city council elections in 2014. In the 
council elections UR won a majority of the seats (28 of the 45), however only 10 of the 45 SMDs were 
non-competitive in the 2014 elections. For comparison, in the previous elections in 2009, UR won all 
17 of the SMDs, and non-competitive elections were held in 14 of them. 
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We should also note that over the period 2010-11, some other cases of replacement of very 
resourceful and strong authoritarian heads took place, but the consequences of these changes varied. 
Two well-known large and wealthy republics - Tatarstan and Bashkortostan – are of special interest. In 
Tatarstan, the new leader Minnikhanov was the “hand-picked successor” of the previous incumbent, 
Shaymiev, who managed to persuade the Kremlin to replace him with a loyal lieutenant. As a result, the 
Tatarstan elite was able to protect its own position and preserve the political machine founded by 
Shaymiev. Therefore, the republic remains in the group of stable “hegemonic authoritarian” regions. On 
the other hand, although, as noted above, we placed Bashkortostan in the first group, the degree of 
competitiveness significantly increased in both the PLPR and SMDs after the leadership succession. In 
2008, under the leadership of President Rakhimov, the value of ENPgol was one of the lowest in Russia 
(1.17), and more than 90% of the SMDs were non-competitive, and Bashkortostan was therefore placed 
firmly “in the core” of the “hegemonic authoritarian” group (see on the Figure 1). However, in contrast 
to Shaymiev, Rakhimov did not manage to strike a deal with the Kremlin, over his successor, and the 
new head Khamitov, who is not from Rakhimov’s group, was unable to inherit the political machine 
created by his predecessor. Nonetheless, it is certainly the case that Bashkortostan continues to 
demonstrate loyalty to the Kremlin and UR. Moreover, the traditional ethnic ties, which were one of the 
foundations of Rakhimov’s politics, is still important, therefore in the 2013 regional elections, the value 
of ENPgol increased insignificantly (1.28). In this sense, Bashkortostan is clearly different from 
Moscow. However, the republican elite is not as consolidated and powerful as it was during the time of 
Rakhimov, and consequently, in 2013, one third of the SMDs experienced competitive elections. 
 
Conclusion 
The key conclusions of this study are as follows:  
1) There are considerable differences in the level of competitiveness and support for UR in the PLPR 
and SMD races. United Russia always fares much better in the SMDs. However, the Kremlin’s “party 
of power” is interested in the PLPR part of the electoral system because it guarantees the loyalty of the 
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deputies to the party. In addition, the PLPR elections enable UR to bargain with, and co-opt prominent 
members of other opposition parties, and members of elite groups in the regional assemblies;  
2) The impact of party and electoral reforms on the level of competitiveness in regional assembly 
elections has been shown to be insignificant. In the framework of electoral authoritarianism, Russian 
parties are primarily tools which are used for bargaining between elites rather than genuine political 
actors which seek representation in political institutions. Even after the sharp increase in the number of 
parties registered in the second cycle and the rise in the number of parties participating in the elections, 
UR continued to dominate the membership of all of the regional assemblies and, as in the first cycle, 
only the three second order parties (CPRF, LDPR and JR) were able to garner sizeable percentages of 
the votes. The other minor parties made up no more than 2% of the seats in both cycles;  
 3) Whilst the average results for UR in each round of elections shows that the party dominates the 
membership of Russia’s regional assemblies, a closer level analysis which takes into account the 
differences between the PLPR and SMD elections provides us with a more nuanced picture of sub-
national politics. Our study reveals important variations in the types of “electoral authoritarianism” 
which operate at the sub-national level which have not been uncovered in previous studies which have 
focused only on the party list elections or aggregate results.  
We show that, approximately half of the regions demonstrate stable electoral patterns across both 
cycles and can be placed in one of the following four groups; “hegemonic authoritarian” (19 regions), 
“semi-hegemonic authoritarian” (2 regions), “clearly-competitive authoritarian” (9 regions), and 
“moderately-competitive authoritarian” (14 regions). The remaining regions are located between these 
four groups, or they fluctuate from one group to another. 
These results, demonstrate that even in Putin’s quasi federal state where power has been highly 
centralised, territory and local politics still matter, and alongside other structural factors, help to shape 
electoral outcomes.  In those regions which we may define as “competitive authoritarian” we find higher 
levels of political pluralism and political contestation whilst in those which we define as “hegemonic 
authoritarian” there is far less electoral genuine competition and the party of power totally dominates 
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the political landscape. At the same time, there are strict limits to the amount of contestation that is 
permitted. Even in those regions, where the “clearly-competitive authoritarian” pattern of elections is 
reproduced, the level of competitiveness is qualified by the simple fact, that UR must always be 
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Table 1. Regional assembly elections: electoral systems and competitiveness  
 

































1. Adygeya         2011.03 54 27/27 1.8515 0.5556 2016 50 25/25 1.8074 0.5200 
2. Altay krai      2011.12 68 34/34 2.8336 0.2059 2016 68 34/34 3.1627 0.0882 
3. Altay rep.       2010.03 21 21/20 2.5205 0.1500 2014 21 21/20 2.2015 0.1000 
4. Amur       2011.12 36 36/0 2.4677   2016 36 18/18 2.8238 0.1111 
5. Archangelsk     2009.03 62 31/31 2.1164 0.4194 2013 62 31/31 2.5945 0.2258 
6. Astrakhan       2011.12 58 29/29 2.0653 0.7241 2016 58 29/29 2.6072 0.3448 
7. Bashkortostan   2008.03 120 60/60 1.1696 0.9167 2013 110 55/55 1.2778 0.6727 
8. Belgorod        2010.10 35 18/17 1.5516 0.8235 2015 50 25/25 1.5871 0.6000 
9. Bryansk         2009.03 60 30/30 2.0060 0.4333 2014 60 30/30 1.2968 0.8000 
10. Buryatiya        2007.12 66 33/33 1.6726 0.2813 2013 66 33/33 2.1475 0.1818 
11. Chechnya 2008.10 41 41/0 1.1129   2016 41 41/0 1.1334   
12. Chelyabinsk     2010.10 60 30/30 1.8530 0.7333 2015 60 30/30 1.8814 0.5657 
13. Chukotka   2011.03 12 6/0* 1.4124   2016 15 9/0* 1.6826   
14. Chuvashiya      2011.12 44 22/22 2.4513 0.2727 2016 44 22/22 2.0707 0.3636 
15. Dagestan        2011.03 90 90/0 1.6751   2016 90 90/0 1.3085   
16. Ingushetiya      2011.12 27 27/0 1.3183   2016 32 32/0 1.2848   
17. Irkutsk         2008.10 50 25/21* 2.0107 0.5238 2013 45 23/22 2.4885 0.2273 
18. Ivanovo         2008.03 48 24/24 1.7309 0.1250 2013 26 13/13 1.6453 0.3846 
19. Jewish AO      2011.12 19 10/9 2.2203 0.2222 2016 19 10/9 2.5516 0.4444 
20. Kabardino-
Balkariya    2009.03 72 72/0 
1.4535 
  2014 70 70/0 
1.6505 
  
21. Kaliningrad     2011.03 40 20/20 2.8356 0.2000 2016 40 20/20 2.6447 0.1500 
22. Kalmykiya        2008.03 27 27/0 1.9452   2013 27 27/0 1.8197   
23. Kaluga          2010.03 40 40/0 2.0047   2015 40 20/20 1.6818 0.4500 
24. Kamchatka    2011.12 28 14/14 2.4216 0.2143 2016 28 14/14 2.2133 0.2857 
25. Karachaevo-
Cherkessiya 2009.03 73 37/36 
1.5142 
0.7222 2014 50 50/0 
1.4424 
  
26. Kareliya         2011.12 50 25/25 3.8384 0.1600 2016 36 18/18 3.4748 0.0556 
27. Kemerovo        2008.10 36 18/18 1.1786 1.0000 2013 46 23/23 1.1087 1.0000 
28. Khabarovsk      2010.03 26 13/13 2.3150 0.0000 2014 36 18/18 1.7362 0.4444 
29. Khakasiya        2009.03 75 38/37 1.9322 0.5676 2013 50 25/25 2.2864 0.1200 
30. Khanty-Mansi 
AO 2011.03 35 18/14* 
2.5033 
0.2857 2016 38 19/19 
2.2515 
0.3684 
31. Kirov           2011.03 54 27/27 3.0448 0.1154 2016 54 27/27 2.9422 0.2222 
32. Komi 2011.03 30 15/15 2.1454 0.2667 2015 30 15/15 1.6808 0.4667 
33. Kostroma        2010.10 36 18/8 2.2181 0.2778 2015 36 18/18 1.9421 0.3333 
34. Krasnodar       2012.10 100 50/50 1.3252 0.9400 2017 70 35/35 1.4418 0.9714 
35. Krasnoyarsk     2011.12 52 26/22* 3.0036 0.3636 2016 52 26/22* 2.7713 0.0000 
36. Kurgan          2010.03 34 17/17 2.7049 0.5294 2015 34 17/17 1.8734 0.5294 
37. Kursk           2011.03 45 23/22 2.4354 0.5455 2016 45 22/23 2.1326 0.7391 
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38. Leningrad 
Oblast 2011.12 50 25/25 
3.1400 
0.0000 2016 50 25/25 
2.0555 
0.5600 
39. Lipetsk        2011.12 56 28/28 2.8966 0.2857 2016 56 28/28 1.8407 0.4643 
40. Magadan         2010.10 21 11/10 2.1077 0.6000 2015 21 11/10 1.7996 0.9000 
41. Marii El         2009.10 52 26/26 1.5688 0.6538 2014 52 26/26 1.4746 0.6154 
42. Mordoviya        2011.12 48 24/24 1.0939 0.9583 2016 48 24/24 1.2000 0.9583 
43. Moscow          2009.10 35 18/17 1.4724 0.8235 2014 45 0/45   0.2222 
44. Moscow Oblast     2011.12 50 25/25 3.1859 0.0400 2016 50 25/25 2.1786 0.0000 
45. Murmansk        2011.12 36 18/18 3.2997 0.0556 2016 32 16/16 2.5434 0.0625 
46. Nenets AO   2009.03 11 11/0 2.5887   2014 19 11/8 2.4595 0.2500 
47. Nizhegorod 
Oblast       2011.03 50 25/25 
2.6014 
0.2000 2016 50 25/25 
1.8292 
0.6400 
48. North Ossetiya    2012.10 70 35/35 2.3804 0.5143 2017 70 70/0 1.7744   
49. Novgorod        2011.12 26 13/13 3.0122 0.0769 2016 32 16/16 2.7165 0.1875 
50. Novosibirsk     2010.10 76 38/38 2.4779 0.2632 2015 76 38/38 2.3560 0.3421 
51. Omsk            2011.12 44 22/22 2.8196 0.4091 2016 44 22/22 2.8831 0.2273 
52. Orenburg        2011.03 47 24/23 2.6808 0.1739 2016 47 24/23 2.6120 0.1739 
53. Oryol            2011.12 50 25/25 2.7079 0.3600 2016 50 25/25 2.4150 0.6000 
54. Penza           2012.10 36 18/18 1.3451 0.7222 2017 36 18/18 1.4557 0.8333 
55. Perm            2011.12 60 30/30 2.8309 0.5000 2016 60 30/30 2.4117 0.4000 
56. Primorsky krai      2011.12 40 20/20 3.2653 0.1500 2016 40 20/20 2.8752 0.1000 
57. Pskov           2011.12 44 22/22 3.1938 0.1818 2016 44 22/22 2.5922 0.4545 
58. Rostov          2008.03 50 25/25 1.4340 0.8800 2013 60 30/30 1.5651 0.7667 
59. Ryazan          2010.03 36 18/18 2.1176 0.5556 2015 36 18/18 1.6134 0.8333 
60. Sakhalin        2012.10 28 14/14 1.9363 0.2857 2017 28 14/14 2.0933 0.0714 
61. Samara          2011.12 50 25/25 2.6870 0.2400 2016 50 25/25 1.9920 0.4400 
62. Saratov         2012.10 45 23/22 1.2422 0.9545 2017 45 23/22 1.5260 0.6818 
63. Smolensk        2007.12 48 24/22* 2.1517 0.3182 2013 48 24/24 2.5609 0.2500 
64. St Petersburg 2011.12 50 50/0 3.2264   2016 50 25/25 3.0030 0.2000 
65. Stavropol       2011.12 50 25/25 2.2890 0.6800 2016 50 25/25 1.9758 0.5600 
66. Sverdlovsk 
Oblast       2011.12 50 25/25 
3.2263 
0.0800 2016 50 25/25 
2.5866 
0.2000 
67. Tambov          2011.03 50 25/25 1.5874 0.8000 2016 50 25/25 1.7377 0.7600 
68. Tatarstan       2009.03 100 50/50 1.2714 0.9400 2014 100 50/50 1.1535 1.0000 
69. Tomsk           2011.12 42 21/21 2.8602 0.3333 2016 42 21/21 2.5218 0.4286 
70. Tula            2009.10 48 48/0 1.8940   2014 38 19/19 1.4641 0.9474 
71. Tuva            2010.10 32 16/16 1.2716 0.8750 2014 32 16/16 1.1320 0.9375 
72. Tver            2011.03 40 20/20 2.7989 0.2500 2016 40 20/20 2.3118 0.2500 
73. Tyumen           2011.12 48 24/24 1.9886 0.5833 2016 48 24/24 1.8814 0.7500 
74. Udmurtiya        2012.10 90 45/45 1.8428 0.4222 2017 60 30/30 1.6118 0.4667 
75. Ulyanovsk       2008.03 30 15/15 1.6957 0.6000 2013 36 18/18 1.5751 0.3889 
76. Vladimir        2009.03 38 19/19 2.1139 0.2632 2013 38 19/19 2.0459 0.2632 
77. Volgograd       2009.03 38 22/16 2.2207 0.3750 2014 38 19/19 1.6101 0.2105 
78. Vologda         2011.12 34 17/17 3.2014 0.1176 2016 34 17/17 2.7876 0.1176 
79. Voronezh        2010.03 56 28/28 1.6709 0.5714 2015 56 28/28 1.3621 0.5357 
80. Yakutiya          2008.03 70 35/35 2.2157 0.3143 2013 70 35/35 2.0483 0.4857 
81. Yamalo-Nenets 
AO 2010.03 22 11/11 
1.5864 




82. Yaroslavl       2008.03 50 25/25 1.9323 0.2400 2013 50 25/25 2.2128 0.2400 
83. Zabaikal’skii 
krai           2008.10 50 25/20* 
2.0252 
0.2500 2013 50 25/25 
2.2763 
0.2800 
* Some special cases with MMDs: Chukotka – two 3-member districts;  Irkutsk - one 4-member 
district; Khanty-Mansi AO – one special 3-member district to guarantee the representation of the 
indigenous population; Krasnoyarsk kray - two 2-member districts; Smolensk – one 2-member district; 
Zabaikal’skii kray - one 5-member district.  
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Table 2. Results of the PLPR Contests in Regional Assemblies (general for all the regions) 
 1st cycle 2nd cycle 
ENPgol average value 2.193 2.027 
Total number of seats 2225 2105 
UR seats 1346 (60.49%) 1403 (66.65%) 
CPRF seats 382 297 
JR seats 243 160 
LDPR seats  206 201 




Table 3. Number of seats won by parties in the SMDs and competitiveness of the elections (general for 
all regions) 
  1st cycle 2nd cycle 
Number SDMs 1740 1766 
Non-Competitive SMDs 807 792 
Share of Non-Competitive SMDs 0,4638 0,4485 
Total number of UR candidates  1680 1688 
UR candidates won 1474 1582 
including Non-Competitive SMDs 762 (51.7%) 752 (47.5%) 
UR candidates lost 206 106 
including Non-Competitive SMDs 19 (9.2%) 12 (11.3%) 
UR didn't nominate candidates  60 78 
including Non-Competitive SMDs 26 (43.3%) 28 (35.9%) 
CPRF candidates won 73 41 
JR candidates won 51 24 
LDPR candidates won 6 14 
Other parties candidates won 10 22 




Figure 1. Scatter Diagram for the 1st cycle of regional assembly elections 
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Figure 2. Scatter Diagram for the 2nd cycle of regional assemblies’ elections 
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Table 4. Regions with stable patterns of electoral competitiveness  
 “Hegemonic authoritarian” 
– 19 regions 
Kemerovo (27), Mordoviya (42), Tatarstan (68), Krasnodar (34), 
Tuva (71), Rostov (58), Yamalo Nenets AO (81), Tambov (67), Penza 
(54), Chechnya (11), Ingushetiya (16), Kabardino-Balkariya (20), 
Dagestan (15), Chukotka (13), Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (25), Tula 
(70), Saratov (62), Bashkortostan (7), Tyumen (73) 
“Clearly-competitive 
authoritarian” – 9 regions 
Novgorod (49), Kirov (31), Vologda (78), Primorsky Kray (56), 
Kareliya (26), St Petersburg (64), Murmansk (45), Sverdlovsk (66), 
Altay krai (2) 
“Semi-hegemonic 
authoritarian”  – 2 regions 
Kursk (37), Stavropol (65) 
“Moderately-competitive 
authoritarian” – 14 regions 
Altay republic (3), Buryatiya (10), Kaliningrad (21), Kamchatka (24), 
Orenburg (52), Vladimir (76), Tver (72), Sakhalin (60), Yaroslavl 
(82), Zabaikal’skii krai (83), Novosibirsk (50), Khanty-Mansi AO 




Table 5. Results of the Regression Analyses (values of B coefficients; St.er. in parenthesis) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ENP CompSMD ENP* 
CompSM
D 


















































R-square 0,243 0,140 0,148 0,334 0,267 ,257 
Significance *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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